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Background: In the recent case of R v Taj, the Court of Appeal of England & Wales 
upheld the conviction of a defendant who, in a psychotic delusional state, mistook his non-
threatening victim to be a terrorist, violently attacking him. The law typically allows honest 
mistakes (even if unreasonable) as a basis for self-defence (in this case the defence of others). 
But because Taj’s delusions were found by the court to have been caused by voluntary alcohol 
consumption, special legal (prior-fault) intoxication rules were applied to block his defence; 
Taj was convicted and sentenced to 19 years for attempted murder.  
Argument: We focus here on the simple question – what does it mean to be 
intoxicated? On the facts, Taj did not have drugs active in his system at the time of the attack, 
but the court nonetheless insisted that Taj’s delusional mistake was ‘attributable to 
intoxication’, namely to drink and drug-taking in the previous days and weeks. This extended 
conception of intoxication was questionably distinguished from psychosis induced by 
withdrawal. Furthermore, the court was unreceptive to evidence of a long-standing, 
underlying mental health disorder.  We argue that the court’s expanded view of intoxication 
is problematic in that intoxication-induced psychosis cannot be sharply distinguished from 
other causes such as mental disorders. And even if it could be distinguished, it should not give 
rise to blame and punishment in the same way as conduct induced by chemically active 
intoxicants (‘drug-on-board’) does. 
Conclusion: The courts’ expansion of the definition of intoxication is both legally and 
forensically problematic, introducing legal vagaries where the clinical science is already 
vague. And with intoxication frequently interlocking with historic intoxication and secondary 




or co-morbid mental health conditions, the decision risks inappropriately and/or over-
criminalising defendants.   
Keywords: Criminal law, self-defence, alcohol and drugs, mens rea, mental disorders. 
Introduction  
A disproportionate number of criminal offenses are committed by persons who, as a 
result of consuming alcohol and/or other psychoactive drugs, were intoxicated to one degree 
or another at the time of their offense (1–5). For instance, data from the annual Crime Survey 
of England & Wales (6) found that among victims of violent offenses, 52% judged their 
assailant to have been intoxicated; a percentage that grew to 83% as the night, and 
presumably intoxication levels, progressed. Indeed, the latest, 5th edition of the Diagnostic 
Statistical Manual (7), while having removed ‘legal problems’ from the list of diagnostic 
criteria for substance abuse disorder, makes explicit reference to criminality, in the case of 
alcohol as being “associated with the commission of criminal acts, including homicide” (p. 
496). Of course, not all criminal offenses are equally linked with alcohol or drug abuse, and 
(discounting drug possession offences) not all drugs are equally associated with criminal 
offending (1,8). And while the correlational evidence is robust, understanding of the causal 
relationship between drug consumption and criminality is not, with most experts accepting a 
combination of factors to be involved (1,9–11).  
The large number of offenders who were intoxicated at the time of their offence that 
end up in criminal court pose difficult questions, especially where (as is often the case) states 
of intoxication interlock with alcohol or substance abuse disorders and/or other mental 
health conditions (12–15). On the one hand, the ‘voluntary choice’ to become intoxicated and 
potentially dangerous may intuitively be considered blameworthy; yet on the other, the 




causal complexities of that ‘voluntary choice’ (e.g., in the case of physical or psychological 
dependence, and/or addiction), and equally complex effects on the brain, may challenge 
those intuitions. Normative conundrums of this kind have given rise to a voluminous and 
complex body of case-law (jurisprudence) developed in the courts, to which the recent Court 
of Appeal decision in Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743 provides one of the most significant, and in 
our view problematic additions. This is because in deciding Taj, the court effectively re-
defined what it means to be intoxicated, exacerbating existing confusions and creating new 
ones. Our debate focuses on Taj and responses to it. But first, we briefly discuss the wider 
legal context and why intoxication matters for the criminal law. 
Intoxication and the criminal law 
Intoxication resulting from alcohol or other psychoactive drug consumption matters 
for the criminal law, because mental and volitional capacities are centrally important for our 
moral and legal conceptions of responsibility and blame. That is, the law normally requires 
that a person, at the time of their harmful act, had the requisite mental (cognitive) and/or 
volitional capacity to be held criminally responsible. And where such capacities are found to 
have been substantially undermined, as a matter of logic and law, that defendant should not 
be held responsible for offences charged. In this way, the law avoids criminalising acts 
committed by e.g. children under the age of criminal responsibility (in England and Wales, 
under the age of 10); acts committed during sleep walking or epileptic seizures, by defendants 
with profound intellectual disabilities and/or mental disorders (e.g. by satisfying the 
M’Naghten insanity defence; (16)); and more generally by persons who at the time of acting 
lacked the voluntariness and/or requisite mens rea (‘guilty mind’) for the offense.   




If a defendant’s intoxicated state caused a lack of mens rea (e.g., for the offence of 
reckless manslaughter, foresight of causing death or serious harm), or a severe lack of 
volitional control, it provides a potential basis for a denial of liability; he/she would not be 
held responsible for the offence charged. However, in practice and across jurisdictions, the 
odds of such a ‘defence of drunkenness’ (17) succeeding are severely limited. In first instance, 
because the law requires very low levels of awareness and control for mens rea and volitional 
thresholds to be satisfied (18). This allows courts to avoid engaging with difficult questions 
around degrees of impairment. Most issues arising from compromised capacities will 
therefore be relevant at sentencing only, where decisions on punishment, and factors that 
serve to mitigate or aggravate, take a more nuanced (i.e., less binary) approach. 
Second, and important to our current debate, even if such a ‘defence of drunkenness’ 
could in theory apply, so-called prior-fault intoxication rules have developed to ensure that 
liability will nonetheless result. That is, in circumstances of voluntary intoxication, the prior-
fault intoxication rules effectively blame defendants for “creating the conditions of their own 
defence” (19); in this way, intoxicated defendants can be convicted, labelled and punished (in 
law) as if they had the relevant capacity and mens rea, they in fact were lacking at the time 
of the offence. For example, where a defendant causes death while intoxicated, these rules 
may be applied to manufacture liability for manslaughter, even where foresight of serious 
harm (or alternative fault) is lacking. 
The prior fault intoxication rules  
The criminal law typically maintains a narrow focus, analysing and blaming a 
defendant’s conduct and mental state at a snap-shot moment in time. We ask whether the 
defendant caused a specific harm, at a specific time with the requisite foresight or intent; we 




do not look further back in time to diffuse motivations or character. The prior-fault 
intoxication rules significantly break with this paradigm. Although a defendant may lack the 
requisite mens rea when causing harm, or hold an honest but mistaken belief that could 
otherwise provide the basis for a defence (e.g. an honest but mistaken belief that self-defence 
was required), the intoxication rules allow us to look back in time to assess whether such 
mental states or beliefs are attributable to the voluntary ingestion of drugs and/or alcohol. 
And where voluntary intoxication provides such an explanation, a legal fiction is created: 
Constructing liability essentially by equating the fault for a specific crime with the fault for 
becoming voluntarily intoxicated; what can be referred to as ‘imputing fault’.  
The imputing of fault through prior-fault intoxication rules is done in order to reach 
an intuitively just outcome.  An outcome neatly espoused by the House of Lords in the leading 
decision of DPP v Majewski (Table 1), involving a defendant who, under the influence of large 
amounts of alcohol, pentobarbital and dextroamphetamine, violently assaulted four persons, 
including two police officers:  
“If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off the 
restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done to him by holding him answerable 
criminally for any injury he may do while in that condition.”  
Equivalent legal rules exist, with varied degrees of complexity and punitiveness, across 
most jurisdictions internationally, including in the US (e.g., Model Penal Code, section 
2.08(2)); Australia (the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995, section 8.2(1)); Canada (e.g., 
Leary (1977) 33 CCC (2d) 473 and Daviault (1994) 93 CCC (3d) 21); and so on. Our point being 
that legal implications arise from being found ‘intoxicated’ at the time of the alleged offence 
in all jurisdictions, and to profound effect. When assessing a defendant’s blameworthiness 




for an offence committed, fault is imputed to ensure a conviction or to block defences that 
would otherwise be available. Moreover, evidence of intoxication is also relevant at 
sentencing, aggravating sentences and blocking mitigation that would otherwise be available, 
e.g., on the basis of a mental health disorder (21). 
The justification for the intoxication rules is rooted in important policy aims to ensure 
that intoxicated and dangerous individuals are not left free to cause future harms. And 
sometimes this makes complete sense; for instance, when a person becomes intoxicated with 
the explicit purpose and expectation that this will enable them to commit an offense (22). But 
outside such rare ‘Dutch courage’ scenarios, things become more complicated and 
problematic, and the prior-fault rules have attracted sharp criticism from legal scholars, 
philosophers, and law reform bodies (23,24). The overarching concern being that the 
intoxication rules have been drawn too widely, and risk inappropriately and/or over-
criminalising defendants. In certain jurisdictions, this has even led to the rejection of prior-
fault intoxication rules altogether, for example (and controversially) in New Zealand and the 
Australian state of Victoria.  
Detailed review of the legal arguments and concerns about the prior-fault rules as 
currently applied is beyond the scope of our debate here, and we direct the interested reader 
to published works by others (25,26), as well as our own (20,27,28). Instead, we focus here 
on a preliminary question that seems (perhaps surprisingly) to have rarely troubled courts; 
namely, when do we classify a defendant as ‘intoxicated’ such that the prior-fault rules apply? 
It is a question that recently came to the forefront in England & Wales in the Court of Appeals’ 
decision in the case of Taj. 
The case of R v Simon Taj 




At around 2pm on Sunday 31st January 2016, Simon Taj was driving along the Albert 
Embankment in London, when he came across the broken-down vehicle of Mohammed 
Awain. Smoke was coming from Awain’s vehicle and Taj stopped to offer assistance. Awain is 
an electrician and wires and equipment were visible in the open boot. Unfortunately, Taj 
mistook the equipment to be components of a terrorist bomb that he believed Awain was 
about to assemble and explode. Taj called the police, who attended the scene, and following 
assurances that Awain was innocent, he initially drove away. But with lingering thoughts that 
Awain was a terrorist and that he must do something to stop him, Taj returned. At 2.46 pm, 
Taj launched a ferocious attack on Awain with a metal tyre lever, almost killing him. When 
police arrived and restrained Taj, he expressed surprise; ‘why are you arresting me, he's the 
terrorist’.  
Taj was charged and found guilty of attempted murder, despite claiming to have acted 
in self-defence (in this case, the defence of others) on the basis of his mistaken belief that his 
victim was a terrorist about to explode a bomb; a defence in English law that, since the case 
of Gladstone Williams (78 CR. App. R. 276 1984) requires such a mistaken belief to have been 
genuine, but not necessarily reasonable. However, the forensic expert opinion evidence at 
trial indicated that Taj’s mistaken belief was the result of a delusional state of mind associated 
with a psychotic episode; and because Taj, a chronic drug and alcohol user with a history of 
delusions and psychotic episodes, had been drinking heavily on the days before his attack on 
Awain, he was disallowed from relying on the defence. Taj was sentenced to 19 years in 
prison; a conviction subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal.  
The ‘Majewski’ intoxication rules would have provided a clear and straightforward path 
for the courts to disallow Taj’s claim of mistaken self-defence, were it not for the fact that he 




did not have drugs or alcohol active in his system at the time of the attack.  He claimed not to 
have taken any alcohol or drugs since the early hours of the previous day. And because no 
drug test was performed by the police, and Taj was lucid at interview, the court accepted that 
there were no intoxicants active at the time of the attack. Instead, the courts relied on the 
expert opinion that Taj’s psychotic state and delusional belief were attributable to his 
previous heavy use on the days before; the court finding that ‘the words “attributable to 
intoxication” [..] are broad enough to encompass both (a) a mistaken state of mind as a result 
of being drunk or intoxicated at the time and (b) a mistaken state of mind immediately and 
proximately consequent upon earlier drink or drug-taking’ (emphasis added). In so doing, the 
potential scope of the prior-fault intoxication rules, and associated fault imputation, was 
expanded significantly.    
Taj was always going to be a difficult case 
The Court’s decision in Taj is readily understood from the policy perspective; persons 
like him who become delusional and dangerous after consuming alcohol or drugs, and who 
continue to be dangerous even after the pharmacological effects dissipate, are a risk to the 
public, and so the law must respond. An important question of course is how the law should 
respond: whether through criminal conviction and punishment, civil detention (potentially 
via the defence of insanity, leading to compulsory hospitalization), or some other 
preventative mechanism. But our concern here is that the response in Taj, to expand the 
definition of ‘intoxication’ to capture effects “immediately” and “proximately” to drink or 
drug-taking, even to drink and drugs taken weeks, even months ago, introduces problematic 
vagaries to the already expansive intoxication rules, together with forensic uncertainty. 
Problematic because it risks inappropriate punishment of defendants who frequently present 




in court with complex clinical profiles involving acute intoxication, historic intoxication, 
and/or secondary or primary co-morbid mental health conditions (12–14). And where no 
apparent boundaries exist to specify where ‘proximate’ begins or ends, the risk of capturing 
the latter conditions increases. 
Before the decision in Taj, courts had been careful to distinguish cases like Majewski, 
where a defendant’s disordered thinking was caused by intoxicants, pharmacologically active 
at the time of causing harm, from forms of disordered thinking arising sometime after the 
acute drug effects had worn off. Persons in the latter category were not regarded as 
intoxicated (and therefore would not be captured by the prior-fault intoxication rules), even 
when it was clear that their dangerous, delusional thoughts would not have presented unless 
intoxicants had previously been taken. In the case of Harris (Table 1), for instance, the 
defendant in a psychotic delusional state arising from abruptly terminating a drinking binge 
that lasted several days, recklessly endangered his neighbours by starting a fire. The court 
decided that Majewski was not apposite because Harris’s delusions emerged only after he 
had stopped drinking; attributing his psychosis and delusions to alcohol withdrawal, not to 
acute intoxication.  Harris was found not liable for the offence charged. 
The distinction drawn in Harris and similar cases was famously set out by Lord 
Birkenhead in the case of Beard (Table 1), quoting Justice J Stephens in Davis (Davis, Cox CC 
563, 1881), that “drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness leads are 
different things; and if a man by drunkenness brings on a state of disease which causes such 
a degree of madness, [..] then he would not be criminally responsible”. But on the facts in 
relation to the cause of psychosis, Harris and Taj appear remarkably similar. The only 
apparent difference being that in Harris the time between his cessation of drinking and his 




delusions leading him to set fire 4-5 days later was more protracted than in Taj; but a closer 
reading of the evidence in Harris shows that his symptoms (“hearing voices, “talking into 
space”) presented (at least) within 2-3 days of abstinence.   
Table 1 describes these and other notable cases to further illustrate the difficult task 
faced by courts, and the forensic experts that assist them, when differentiating between 
potential causes of psychosis and delusions. And with the legal outcome critically dependent 
on which cause is identified as primary, lines must be drawn sharply and carefully: with 
intoxication likely resulting in a conviction; a verdict of insanity in a (technical) acquittal but 
potentially leading to compulsory hospital orders; and other causes in a complete and 
unqualified acquittal. But such distinctions are rarely straightforward where defendants like 
Taj appear in court; and it is our view that the court’s decision to expand the ambit of 
intoxication has made the law even less straightforward to apply.  
The position in Taj should be understood, but rejected 
Outside of drunk driving laws (where strict legal thresholds exist based on blood or 
breath alcohol concentration), no definition of intoxication exists within the law; inevitably 
leaving courts to respond ad hoc to particular facts. To this point, a recent review of 327 
appellate decisions in the Australian courts revealed that, in deciding whether a person was 
intoxicated or not, medical and/or scientific evidence was only marginally considered by 
judges and juries, more often relying on common knowledge characterized by “imprecision 
and a reliance on vernacular expressions” (29). For its purpose, the court in Taj relied on the 
Oxford Dictionaries’ entry for intoxication to mean, "The action of rendering stupid, 
insensible, or disordered in intellect, with a drug or alcoholic liquor; the making drunk or 
inebriated; the condition of being so stupefied or disordered.”  




In the absence of toxicological evidence at trial, as was the case in Taj, the court’s 
decision to rely on the Oxford Dictionary may be understandable. But the lack of precise 
engagement at even this basic level makes the court’s subsequent faith in science to draw 
sharp lines between different longer-term sequelae of drug abuse rather surprising.  That is, 
the courts noted: 
  “The fact is that medical science has advanced such that, in the modern age, the 
longer term sequelae of abusing alcohol or drugs are better known and understood; and … it 
was agreed that Taj's episode of paranoia which led him to mistake the innocent Mr Awain as 
a terrorist was a direct result of his earlier drink and drug-taking in the previous days and 
weeks.”    
At its heart, the court makes two core assumptions about the intoxication rules, both 
of which we challenge. First is the assumption that post drug-on-board psychosis (that is, 
psychosis emerging after the direct pharmacological actions of a drug or alcohol have 
dissipated) can and should be subject to criminal blame in line with the intoxication rules 
derived from cases like Majewski; cases involving defendants with drugs active in their 
systems at the time of the offence (but distinct from withdrawal and other mental disorders). 
Second, and our continued focus below, is the assumption that the law can incorporate a 
settled and robust set of clinical distinctions to make this policy workable in practice.  
The reality is that the symptoms of psychosis – principally delusions and hallucinations 
– can occur in a range of alcohol and/or drug-related conditions including acute intoxication, 
withdrawal (delirium tremens), alcohol or drug-induced psychotic disorder (alcohol 
hallucinosis),  or more pervasive disorders associated with alcoholism (e.g., Korsakoff’s 
dementia), etc. But they could equally indicate the presence of a co-morbid mental illness 




caused or triggered by drug and/or alcohol use, or entirely separate from drug or alcohol use 
(30–37). These various causes of psychotic symptoms are understood from the research and 
clinical literature as being distinct; but understanding of the precise phenomenological 
features and underlying neurobiological mechanisms is far from settled (38,39), making 
differential diagnosis to separate one from the others complex and prone to error. To this 
point, in a three-year follow-up study of 535 cases initially diagnosed as acute cannabis-
induced psychosis, 44.5% were later re-diagnosed as (also) having a schizophrenic-spectrum 
disorder (40). In line, a recent study conducted on a large Finnish in-patient sample showed 
that across substances (including cannabis, alcohol, and amphetamines) rates of conversion 
from substance-induced psychotic disorder (SIPs) to schizophrenia varied between 5% (in the 
case of alcohol) and 46% (in the case of cannabis). While such results give us little clarity of 
the causal relationship between SIPs and schizophrenia, or other disorders associated with 
psychosis such as manic-depression (12,41), they illustrate the potential for co-morbidity and 
diagnostic uncertainty. 
Taj is a case-in-point. Though he was not under the acute influence of alcohol or drugs 
at the time of the attack, Taj had a long history of alcohol and drug use (dating back to his 
early teens) interlocked with previous occasions, starting in 2009, when he presented with 
symptoms described as involving “paranoid, screaming and shouting”, “persecutory ideas”, 
“hallucinations” and “hearing voices”, and more generalised symptoms of low mood, anxiety 
and stress. Some of his past psychotic episodes, and previous run-ins with the law, 
(ostensibly) attributed to his use of drugs (cannabis and cocaine) and/or alcohol. Post-arrest, 
the expert reports provide a similarly complex picture, describing long periods of calm, 
stability and normalcy, interrupted by periods of agitation, disinhibition, and instances of 
grandeur and overt aggression; and one occasion when in prison resulting in him severely 




injuring himself and requiring medical attention. The clinical picture is one of complexity and 
accurately described by one of Taj’s doctors, noting that “I’m afraid this man’s mental health 
problems and diagnosis is not straightforward.”  
It is not our aim to relitigate Taj here, or to argue that the forensic experts assisting 
the court mis-attributed his delusions at the time of his assault on Awain to ‘drug or alcohol-
induced psychotic disorder’; which in itself is used by some as a catch-all to refer to psychosis 
and delusions associated in some way with the acute or chronic use of alcohol or drugs 
(42,43). It is simply to contend that the legal assumptions made in Taj are problematic: 
problematic in general, setting a strict legal threshold on uncertain clinical diagnostic grounds; 
and uncertain on the facts of Taj itself.  
On the latter point, it is important to note that the accompanying expert reports make 
clear their initial diagnosis was a ‘best guess’ having tried to rule out other causes. Indeed, 
the final expert opinion report before Taj’s appeal (following further treatment and 
observation), heavily qualifies the earlier agreement with a new diagnosis of mental illness, 
namely bipolar disorder (manic depression), identified as an alternative cause of his 
psychosis. The response from the Court of Appeal, persisting in an intoxication analysis, was 
again notable: “that a psychotic episode may have been precipitated without alcohol or drugs 
says nothing about whether it was (as Taj agreed he knew to be the case) in fact precipitated 
on this occasion by alcohol and drugs.” This response is, with respect, deeply problematic. 
Having expanded the intoxication rules into the uncertain realms of ‘attributable to’ forms of 
delusions, the burden of proving causal links to prior intoxication must remain firmly on the 
prosecution. But the courts’ approach here, requiring the defence to ‘prove the negative’ 
effectively reverses the burden of proof, requiring the defence to demonstrate the absence 




of a causal role of intoxication (and thus, of prior-fault imputation), further risking 
overcriminalization.    
Conclusions 
We are not arguing here that potentially dangerous individuals like Taj should be 
released to walk the streets. Rather, if we are going to blame individuals for intoxicated or 
intoxication-related states that result in harmful conduct, and if we are going to distinguish 
this from mental conditions secondary to and/or separate from drug use, then the only 
sensible way to do so is to define intoxication narrowly. To expand this definition even 
partially, as the court in Taj has done, is both normatively undesirable (risking criminalisation 
of acts attributable to mental disorders) and forensically problematic (blurring legal lines 
where the clinical science is already blurry). We argue elsewhere that the defence of insanity 
should have applied in Taj, despite the unpalatable and stigmatizing label of ‘insanity’ when 
used in non-legal contexts (44). Such an outcome would have allowed for both a technical 
acquittal (on the basis of a lack of culpability) and compulsory treatment and detention 
(recognising the risk of future dangerousness) (28).  
But more critically, the reason for our rejection of the court’s interpretation of the 
intoxication rules (providing legal precedent going forward) can be stated briefly: we doubt 
that any brain changes subsequent to an intoxicated state can be said to have been caused 
by that intoxication, such that we could or should blame the defendant in the same way that 
we blame drug-on-board states within the legal intoxication rules. The legal concept-creep 
that we have described in this debate risks the inappropriate criminalization of some of the 
most vulnerable defendants in the justice system, suffering from mental health disorders. We 




believe that there is a legal, moral and clinical duty to call for clarity, and to resist any 
developments of this kind. 
 
  




Table 1. Notable precedential cases in England and Wales involving intoxication and delusions 
Case citation and offense details Drug and mental health history Court’s finding and reasoning 
Beard [1920] AC 479. Charged with 
manslaughter after, in a drunken, intoxicated 
state, accidentally suffocating his victim during 
the act of raping her. 
Long history of addiction. Convicted on basis of the 
intoxication rules. Distinguished 
drunkenness from mental disease 
that stems from drunkenness. 
Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223. Following a day 
of playing violent video games and smoking 
strong cannabis, entered neighbour’s house 
dressed in balaclava and dark clothing, 
attacking victim with a ‘Rambo’ knife almost 
killing him. Charged with attempted murder but 
claimed to have suffered psychosis and 
blackout and acted involuntarily. 
Was regular and heavy user of 
cannabis (starting at 13) and 
had experienced cannabis-
related blackouts and paranoia 
on previous occasions. No 
unrelated mental illness. 
Court upholds conviction arguing 
that defence on basis of 
psychotic state/blackouts did not 
amount to insanity or 
automatism, and state was 
induced by voluntary cannabis 
intoxication; Majewski 
intoxication rules apply. 
Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10. Charged with 
murder after savagely punching and kicking 
victim in drunken and psychotic state, killing 
him. Defence raised mental abnormality 
following recent bereavement as basis for 
diminished responsibility. 
Diagnosed with adjustment 
disorder, caused by extreme 
grief and prescribed Prozac and 
sleeping pills. Evidence of 
alcohol dependency. 
While intoxicated at time of 
killing the court focused on 
mental condition and allowed 
application of diminished 
responsibility, reducing murder 
to manslaughter. 
Harris [2013] EWCA Crim 223. Charged with 
aggravated arson for setting fire to his 
property, after an internal voice ordered him 
to. Had been drinking heavily, then stopped 6 
days before. Described as ‘hearing voices’ and 
‘talking into space’ shortly after cessation. 
Prior diagnosis of depression 
and history of drinking, 
alternated by periods of 
abstinence; some associated 
with alcohol-induced psychosis 
or hallucinosis leading to one 
forced hospitalization. 
Lacked mens rea for the offense 
caused by the absence of alcohol 
(withdrawal). Court found that 
Majewski intoxication rules did 
not apply and should not be 
extended to withdrawal from 
alcohol or cannabis. 
Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951. Charged with 
murder for killing victim with sledgehammer, 
thinking he was an SAS officer attacking him 
with samurai sword. No recollection of killing 
and claims mistaken self-defence. Had 
consumed 20 pints of beer. 
Suffered from bi-polar 
disorder/manic depression and 
became disinhibited when not 
taking lithium. History of 
alcohol-induced episodes of 
psychosis. 
Convicted on basis of simple 
application of the Majewski 
intoxication rules. Mistaken self-
defence induced by intoxication 
cannot be relied upon. 
Lindo [2016] EWCA Crim 1940. Attacked and 
killed victim with a brick for no apparent 
reason, telling police he had taken ‘cocaine, 
MDMA and weed’; had unknowingly taken 
Ethylone (MDEC). Described feeling ‘bizarre’ 
and acting ‘strangely’. Claimed ‘drug-induced’ 
psychosis’.  
D has personal history of 
depression, and family history 
of mental illness, including 
schizophrenia. 
Court drew distinction between 
voluntary intoxication and 
psychosis induced by the prior 
intoxication. Following 
Dietschmann, potential basis for 
diminished responsibility but 
defence did not succeed. 
Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152. Charged with 
manslaughter for, while under the influence of 
LSD and believing snakes were attacking and he 
was descending into the centre of earth, 
choking and killing girlfriend by cramming bed 
sheets into her mouth. 
Mention of drug addiction. Intoxication rules applied to 
impute missing mens rea and 
volition, resulting in liability for 
manslaughter.  
Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725. Charged with 
GBH after ferociously attacking police, 
experiencing paranoid, persecutorial delusions. 
Increased ‘skunk’ cannabis use in weeks prior, 
thought to have precipitated psychotic state; 
later described as ‘florid psychotic episode’. 
Smoked cannabis regularly and 
had escalated consumption in 
weeks before incident. No 
history of mental illness. 
Convicted at first stage, where his 
defence of mistaken self-defence 
was rejected by the jury. The 
Court of Appeal’s review of case 
resulted in a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity. 
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